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EXPANDING APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL
LEGISLATION CLAUSE OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
In recent years article IV, section 22 of the Illinois constitution has found expanded use in striking at legislation dealing
with tort liability; specifically, in three areas: (1) access to
courts,' (2) remedies available, 2 and (3) monetary limitations.3 The most familiar invocation of article IV, section 22 is
in cases where laws sustain the immunity of governmental
units.4 Almost all of the recent tort cases that involve an application of class legislation manifest the same rule of law.5
I Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dist., 35 Ill. 2d 362,
220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).
2 Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
3Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d 136, 233
N.E.2d 549 (1968).
4 See, e.g., Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d
136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968).
5 The history of the cases from Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d
60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964) to Treece shows how rapidly the Illinos Supreme
Court has overturned several pieces of class legislation upon a single theory.
The theory originated in Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106
N.E.2d 124 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952), where the supreme
court declared paragraph 1, section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act unconstitutional under article IV, section 22 of the Illinois constitution. But Grasse did not discuss the question of governmental immunity
from court actions. That issue did not really arise until Harvey. Between
Grasse and Harvey came the important case of Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 968 (1960). This case held, but not upon the grounds of section 22 of
article IV, that a school district was liable in damages in an action arising
from the negligent action of the school bus. The reasons that prompted the
court to reject the school district's claim of immunity are not at issue here.
However, it is important to note that both before and after the Moliter decision became final in December, 1959, the General Assembly enacted a large
number of laws concerning the tort liability of municipalities. The importance of Harvey is that the supreme court applied to those laws what it declared to be the proper test of constitutionality under article IV, section 22.
The test was taken, for the most part, from that applied in Grasse twelve
years earlier. The legislation that had been adopted by the General Assembly had established a readily discernible pattern of governmental immunities.
For example forest preserves, park districts, and the Chicago Park District
were not to be held liable for negligence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57%, §3(a) ;
ch. 105, §§12.1-1, 333.2(a) (1963). Public and private school tort liability
was limited to $10,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§821-31 (1963). But the
Chicago Board of Education was required to insure its employees, and consequently no limitation on recovery in tort liability was apparent. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122, §34-18.1 (1963). T!he liability of county superintendents of
highways was limited to $10,000. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, §§381-87 (1963).
District highway commissioners and township highway commissioners were,
however, fully liable. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121, §6-402 (1963). Although
counties were not liable for negligence, they had to indemnify sheriffs and
their deputies up to $50,000 for any losses brought about by non-willful torts.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §301.1 (1963). Similarly, drainage districts were
liable for negligent torts, but the commissioners of those districts were absolved of personal liability. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, §4-40 (1963).
Harvey declared that regardless of whether the special legislation attacked under article IV, section 22 was a single law (unrelated to others of
its type) or part of a legislative pattern the same test would be applied:
Many of the activities that frequently give rise to tort liability are
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Broadly stated the rule is that plaintiffs whose injuries are

brought about in the same tortious manner, but who are treated
differently because of the nature of the defendant shall not be
denied access to the courts, or full remedy, or be limited in
monetary recovery, by any statute that legislates by class.6
common to all governmental units. The operation of automobiles is an
obvious example. From the perspective of the injured party, or from
the point of view of ability to insure against liability for negligent operation, there is no reason why one who is injured by a park district truck
should be barred from recovery, while one who is injured by a city or
village truck is allowed to recover, and one injured by a school district
truck is allowed to recover only within a prescribed limit. And to the
extent that recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in violation of section 22 of article IV.
Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60 65, 203 N.E.2d 573, 575 (1964).
The court in Harvey relies heavily on Grasse. In Grasse the court had
stated that it was the classification of those who were injured, not the classification of the defendant, that was controlling. Harvey specifically relied
on the following language from Grasse:
It is readily apparent that there is no rational difference between an
employee injured in the course of his employment by a motorbus, and
one injured by a farmer's truck. Each may sustain the same injuries,
and be entitled to the same amount of compensation from their employers; neither had any control over the circumstances of their injuries,
or the status of the party who hit them, yet in one case, the statute authorizes the employee to recover damages from the third party, and in
the other case the employee must be content with the amount of compensation he may be entitled to receive from his employer.
Id. at 66, 203 N.E.2d at 576. The same reasoning was adopted by the court
in Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.
2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966), Lorton v.
Brown County Com. Unit School Dist., 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966),
and Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d 136, 233
N.E.2d 549 (1968). In an even more recent case, Haymes v. Catholic Bishop,
41 Ill. 2d 336, 243 N.E.2d 203 (1968), the supreme court struck down the
$10,000 damage limitation provided for in the School Code, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 122, §825B (1959). The court relied directly on Harvey, Hutchings, and
Lorton. Similarly, in Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d
457 (1969) the court relied on the whole line of cases from Grasse through
Treece to strike down as unconstitutional section 8(e) 9 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 48, §138.8(e)9 (1967). Thus between
1964 and 1968, the court had developed a rationale and formulated a specific
test for the application of article IV, section 22. In one recent case, Sweney
Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 42 Ill. 2d 266, 247 N.E.2d
603 (1969), the court, although holding for the defendant on other grounds,
accepted unreservedly the concept that the legislature may not constitutionally
create classifications that discriminate in tort cases between plaintiffs similarly situated who are suing defendants who have been classified by virtue
of whether or not they are governmentally regulated. In effect the court
struck down as unconstitutional a provision that allowed regulated corporations the privilege of having exculpatory clauses in their leases. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 80, §15 (a) (1967).
The court, although relying on the case law
of Harvey through Treece, did not even bother to cite such law.
B Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.
2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964). The
court said:
The situation in this case is not unlike that which was before this court
in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act allowed a common law action by an employee who was
injured by the negligence of a third party who was not bound by the
act, but prohibited such an action by an employee who was injured by
the negligence of a third party who was bound by the act. The distincttion between the two types of defendants was held insufficient to afford
a rational basis of classification from the point of view of the injured
person. The court said: "All employees entitled to compensation for injuries sustained in the course of their employment and caused by third
persons are not treated alike. Those injured by third party tortfeasors
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Take as an example the following situation. A girl of the age
of ten rides as a passenger in a taxicab. The driver of the cab
is negligent. His negligence and the negligence of another
driver combine to cause an accident. The girl, who is in no
way contributorily negligent, is seriously injured. Disregarding
for the moment defenses of both the driver of the cab and the
other driver, the girl may recover from them jointly and severally. A lawsuit by the same ten year old girl, however, resulting
from a ride with a friend of the family might have an entirely
different outcome should an accident physically identical to the
first occur.7 There is a good chance that whereas she could
recover from a taxidriver guilty of ordinary negligence, she might
not be able to recover against the friend guilty of equal negligence." The guest statute in Illinois is typical of the type of
class legislation that is being attacked under the expanded application of article IV, section 22 of the Illinois constitution.9
If the example were to be extended to the same ten year old
girl riding in a vehicle of the Chicago Transit Authority a different set of results might occur. For example, although the
bound by the act are not entitled to common-law damages from such persons, whereas those injured by third party tortfeasors not bound by
the act are allowed to institute actions for damages. Both classes of injured employees may be entitled to compensation from their own employers, so that the amount of compensation, if any, received by the
injured employee is not the basis for differentiation between the classes.
Nor is there any basis for differentiation from the nature of the injuries
sustained, or from the activity of the employee at the time of the injury,
or from any other factor ordinarily related to an injured party's right
to recover damages. The sole basis for differentiation, as far as the
injured employee is concerned, is a fortuitous circumstance - whether
the third party tort-feasor [sic] happens to be under the act."
Id. at 65-66, 203 N.E.2d at 576.
She would, of course, be subject to the limitation of the state's guest
statute. She would have to prove more than ordinary negligence:
No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest
without payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint enterprise
with the owner or driver of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, nor his
ersonal representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall
ave a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of
such motor vehicle or motorcycle, or its owner or his employee or agent
for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall
have been caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver or
operator of such motor vehicle or motorcycle or its owner or his employee or agent and unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to relieve a
motor vehicle or motorcycle carrier of passengers for hire of responsibility for injury or death sustained by any passenger for hire. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, §9-201 (1967).
8 Id. Additionally, it might have been better (for the sake of her case)
for the girl to have trespassed in the friend's auto. Certain cases may be
construed to stand for the proposition that the duty to a discovered trespasser
may be to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him. See Briney v. Illinois
Cent. Co., 401 Ill. 181, 81 N.E.2d 866 (1948); Cullman v. Mumper, 83 Ill.
App. 2d 395, 228 N.E.2d 276 (1967) ; and Paterson v. Byrne, 24 Ill. App. 2d
565, 9165 N.E.2d 374 (1960).
See Brief for Appellant at 11-20, Delany v. Bedame, No. 41616 (Ill.
Sup. Ct., filed May 1, 1969).
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girl might be able as in the first two instances to collect damages
from the driver of the car that collided with the bus, taxi, or
friend's car, she might not be able to collect against the negligent
Chicago Transit Authority unless the City of Chicago received
notice within six months of the accident. 1° Were the girl unlucky enough to have been in a similar accident where the driver
of the other vehicle was a state employee on state business, she
might recover nothing at all. The Illinois constitution provides
that the state shall never be made a defendant in any action of
law or equity.There is no guarantee that any case litigated
successfully in the Illinois Court of Claims will actually give rise
to the collection of damages since the state may still choose not
to pay the award ordered by the court of claims. 12 Several elements detrimental to the plaintiff's action are present in a suit
against the state: there are monetary limitations, 13 no right to

appeal is present ;14 there is no right to a jury ;15 there is a six
month notice requirement for personal injuries;l6 and there is
always the knowledge in the plaintiff's mind that the suit is at the
sufferance of the state and that the legislative approval necessary to the collection of damages may not be forthcoming.17
All of the different instances outlined above, however,
would be made even more complicated, and from the plaintiff's
view more discouraging, if the girl were to be killed. In that
situation a suit by the parents for wrongful death would be
faced by the state's wrongful death act.18 By virtue of the act's
silence with respect to punitive damages and the court made rule
that where the act does not provide for damages they may not
be recovered, the plaintiff (probably the parents) will possibly
recover less than if the girl had lived. This may be true even
though that death was brought about under the most willful
and wanton circumstances of negligence on the part of all defendants concerned. 19 This paper is an examination of the case
IL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §8-102 (1967).
CONST. art. IV, §26. Additionally U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2 and
U.S. CONST. amend. XI apparently prohibit the suit. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1933), Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1899), Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527 (1857).
12 Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439 (1967).
20

"1ILL.

Is Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439.8 (1967).
14 Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. RHv. STAT. ch. 37, §439.17 (1967).
15 Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439 (1967).

Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL Rav. STAT. ch. 37, §439.22-2 (1967).
17 Illinois Court of Claims Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §439 (1967).
Is ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §2 (1967).
19 Illinois case law rests on the early case of Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill.
18

410 (1868). The court in that case reasoned that punitive damages could
not be recovered under the act:
This action is the creature of the statute, and must be governed entirely

by its provisions, and as they only provide for compensation for the

pecuniary loss, the evidence should be confined exclusively to that. The
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law in tort actions wherein article IV, section 22 of the Illinois
constitutiono is applied. The legislation involved in the above
hypothesized examples might be affected by future supreme
court decisions. It is, of course, not to be expected that the
constitutional immunity of the sovereign state of Illinois can be
challenged by article IV, section 22 of the same state constitution; but insofar as the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution may be similar to the Illinois constitutional
provision, some challenges to sovereign immunity may be expected. To some extent the similarity of the provisions will be
discussed below.
HISTORY

The abuses of special legislation under the 1848 Illinois
constitution, with the resulting public outcry and judicial condemnation, led to the adoption of article IV, section 22 of the
Illinois constitution of 1870.21

Under the 1848 constitution the

bill of rights was the major delimiting factor that controlled the
passage of special legislation.22 It was the opinion of the Illinois
courts, for example, that the legislation which would force a municipality to incur debts for solely local purposes was unconstitutional under the theory that the sovereign cannot arbitrarily
damages should be compensatory, or approximate thereto, but not vindictive or exemplary.
Id. at 413.
20 ILL. CONST. art. IV, §22.
The entire section is as followsThe General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the
following enumerated cases, that is to say: For - Granting divorces;
Changing the names of persons or places; Laying out, opening, altering
and working roads or highways; Vacating roads, town plats, streets,
alleys and public grounds; Locating or changing county seats; Regulating county and township affairs; Regulating the practice in courts of
justice; Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace,
police magistrates and constables; Providing for changes of venue in
civil and criminal cases; Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or
changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village; Providing for the election of members of the board of supervisors in townships,.
incorporated towns or cities; Summoning and impaneling grand or petit
juries; Providing for the management of common schools; Regulating
the rate of interest on money; The opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting; The sale or mortgage of real
estate belonging to minors or others under disability; The protection of
game or fish; Chartering or licensing ferries or toll bridges; Remitting
fines, penalties or forfeitures; Creating, increasing or decreasing fees,
percentage or allowances of public officers, during the term for which
said officers are elected or appointed; Changing the law of descent;
Granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay
down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters for such purpose;
Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. In all other cases
where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted.
, See Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases, 1 ILL.
L. REv. 63 (1906).
.- Id. at 65-66.
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deprive taxpayers of their property. 23 But the limitations upon
the legislature worked by the bill of rights went only to control
the deprivation of a citizen's property or liberty. Acts that
applied to individual citizens or things were not specifically
forbidden to the legislature; and as a consequence, the legislators were free under the 1848 constitution to enact local or
special laws whenever those laws were not inconsistent with
the basic provisions of the bill of rights. 24 Special or private
laws were passed in ever growing numbers. In People v. Meech,
Justice Walker asserted in strong terms that such laws worked
to the advantage of the few (presumably those who were best
able to afford the expenses of getting private or special laws
passed) and to the injury, both direct and indirect, of the majority. 25 It is only with some idea of the history of the legislative abuses of that era that the clear and detailed prohibitions of
article IV, section 22 of the constitution of 1870 can be understood. Section 22 prohibits the legislature from enacting special
or local laws upon twenty-two distinct subjects; and it then
adds the provision that "[i]n all other cases where a general
26
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
There is no doubt that under the Illinois constitution certain
legislative classifications are valid.2 7 Classification is a necessary legislative tool, and it is inconceivable that the framers of
the 1870 Illinois constitution would not have recognized it as
such.2 8 What the courts at present describe as proper classification under the Illinois constitution is, however, different from
what the earliest opinions of the supreme court appear to indicate; indeed, some of today's opinions are significantly different
from those of less than two decades ago.2 9 The earliest decisions
under the 1870 constitution indicate that the rule followed by the
courts was to the effect that any legislative classification that
applied to members of a group, but not to members of other
23

See People v. Mayor of Chicago, 51 Ill. 17 (1869) ; People v. City of

Chicago, 51 Ill. 58 (1869) ; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218 (1871) ; Barnes
v. Town of Lacon, 84 Ill. 461 (1877).
The Illinois constitution of 1848 did
restrict the powers of the legislature with regard to the passing of special

laws concerning divorces, art. 3, §22, the organization of townships, art. 7,

§6, and the formation of corporations, art. 10, §1. The 1848 constitution also
provided that when private or local laws were enacted, the law had to embrace but one subject, and that subject had to be expressed in the title, art.

3, §23.

24 See Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases, 1 ILL.
L. REv. 63 (1906).
25 101 Ill. 200 (1882).
26
ILL CONST. art. IV, §22.
27 See Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Bd., 278 Ill. 77, 115 N.E. 822
(1917); Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Ill. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911).
28 See I Debates Constitutional Convention 1869-1870, at 576-87, 591-608.
29 The landmark cases as discussed in this paper are Grasse v. Dealer's
Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952) and Harvey v. Clyde Park
Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
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groups similarly situated, was not a local or special law if there
were some rational basis for discriminating among the groups,
and if the reasons for the discrimination were apparent on the
face of the law. 3° The early courts read the provisions of section
22 with little latitude while later courts, whether dealing with
classification by population or other means, refused to interpret
31
Sigthe language of section 22 in a strictly literal manner.
nificantly, when discussing classification questions the Illinois
Supreme Court strongly accentuated the usual proposition that
one who attacks a statute's constitutionality bears the burden of
30 Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill.70 (1883), found valid a law applying
only to municipal corporations formed either after 1870 or those existing
prior to the adoption of the 1870 constitution which did not change their
charter; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 (1886), found an election law valid that applied to only two localities because of the possibility
that other cities or towns might later fall under it. People v. Hazlewood,
116 Ill. 319, 6 N.E. 480 (1886), found valid a classification of towns based
on potential increases in population; Kingsbury v. Sperry, 119 Ill. 279, 10
N.E. 8 (1887), implied that a law allowing an identical proceeding in a
county court but not allowing it in a probate court would be special legislation. West Chicago Park Comm'n v. McMullen, 134 Ill. 170, 25 N.E. 676
(1890), found valid a law giving park commissioners certain powers in connection with governmental units while denying the powers to park districts
not having commissioners. Cummings v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 563, 33
N.E. 854 (1893), allowed classification according to population for the purposes of the payment of special assessments; Trausch v. County of Cook,
147 Ill.534, 35 N.E. 477 (1893), found exceptions for pre-existing institutions within a statute regulating the sale of liquors to be valid; People v.
Board of Trustees, 170 Il1. 468, 48 N.E. 901 (1897) found invalid a law permitting incorporated areas with prohibitory clauses in their charters to be
treated differently from others merely because the electors from the area
desired such treatment. See also Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in
the Illinois Cases, 1 ILL. L. REv. 63 (1906), in which he discusses thirty-two
Illinois special legislation cases. He derives three legal propositions that he
asserts are applicable to all of them. He states: "First: If there is a rational ground for legislating in behalf of the objects to which the Act applies and not for others of the same general sort, and if the rationale of the
distinction is embodied in the Act's description of the objects themselves to
which it applies, then the Act is not a 'local or special' law." Id. at 66-67.
He continues: "Second: If there be no rational ground of distinction, in any
view of the facts, upon which some objects are legislated for and others of
the same general sort are not, the Act is a 'local or special' law." Id. at 70.
Finally he states: "Third: Even if there be one or more rational grounds
for legislating in behalf of the objects to which the Act applies and not for
others of the same general sort, yet if no rational ground is embodied in the
Act's description of the objects to which it applies then the Act is held to be
'local or special.' " Id. at 76.
31 See, e.g., People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N.E.2d 581 (1948), and
People v. City of Springfield, 370 Ill. 541, 19 N.E.2d 598 (1939), which held
valid laws that did not apply to all persons potentially capable of falling
under them, but demanded only that the laws apply to those in "substantially" the same circumstances at any particular time. Laws are not local
or special merely because they operate on a single class or locale if there
is many reasonable basis for the classification, Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain
Corp., 355 Ill.504, 189 N.E. 907 (1934). Population has been accepted as a
reasonable and not arbitrary basis of classification whenever the law has
recognized that the problems solved by statutory recognition are essentially
soluble only by such classification: Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 Il1. 25, 95
N.E.2d 84 (1950); Littell v. City of Peoria, 374 Ill. 344, 29 N.E.2d 533
(1940); Matthews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35 (1930);
Hughes v. Traeger, 264 Ill.612, 106 N.E. 431 (1914); People v. Grover,
258 Ill.124, 101 N.E. 216 (1913), Douglas v. People, 225 I1. 536, 80 N.E.
341 (1907).
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proof.3 2 The court demanded of those who attacked the constitutionality of a classification that they prove not only that it was
arbitrary but that it was completely unreasonable. 33 It was
stated that the basis of classification had to be both unreasonable
and essentially arbitrary.3 4 Just to obtain a judicial review, the
3 5
classification had to be patently arbitrary.
Recently, in Begich v. Industrial Commission,36 Justice
House in his dissenting opinion looked back to Bagdonas v.
Liberty Land & Investment Co.,37 for support. Adopting that
court's language, Justice House reiterates that tile Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the General Assembly
has wide latitude to classify:
The Legislature is not required to be scientific, logical or consistent
in its classifications. In order to authorize a judicial review of such
classifications it must clearly appear that there is no fair reason for
the law that would not require with equal force its extension to
others not included. The Legislature may determine upon what
differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory
classification, between provisions otherwise having resemblance, if
such power is not arbitrarily exercised and the distinction has a
8
reasonable basis.3

The thrust of the quotation adopted by Justice House in his dissenting opinion is essentially that of most of the classification
cases in Illinois until 1952. The court focused its interest upon
two elements: (1) how the legislature distinguished the classes
created, and (2) the basis upon which the classification rested.
In effect, Justice House was reasserting the traditional interpretation of section 22 as it was outlined by Professor Kales
over sixty years ago. 39 A law is not a local or a special law if
the classification is rational on its face: "[i]f there is a rational
ground for legislating in behalf of the objects to which the Act
applies . . . and if the rationale of the distinction is embodied in
the Act's description of the objects themselves to which it applies," then the law is neither local nor special, and it will be up4
held as constitutional. 0
32 Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N.E. 310 (1921); Bagdonas v.
Liberty Land & Inv. Co., 309 Ill. 103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923) ; People v. Saltis,
328 Ill. 494, 160 N.E. 86 (1928).
-3 People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 160 N.E. 86 (1928).
34 Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Inv. Co., 309 Il. 103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923);
Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N.E. 310 (1921).
35 People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361 (1930).
36 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
37 309 Il. 103, 140 N.E. 49 (1923).
38 Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 32, 37, 245 N.E.2d 457, 460

(1969).

39 Kales, Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases, 1 ILL. L.
REV. 63 (1906).
40Id. at 66-67.
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RECENT CASES
There is little doubt that the language of Justice House in
Begich is the traditional language 6f the Illinois Supreme Court
on the question of what is a valid legislative classification under
article IV, section 22 of the Illinois constitution. Nor is his discussion of that section unlike that of the early cases. His dissent speaks in terms of whether the exercise of power by the
legislature was arbitrary and whether such distinctions as were
drawn by the legislature were reasonable. 4 1 But so does the
majority opinion. "Arbitrary" and "reasonable" apparently
mean something different to the majority. An analysis of the
important tort cases in which section 22 was involved indicates
that the Illinois Supreme Court has developed a new functional
42
definition for those words in certain limited areas.
In 1952, the supreme court decided Grasse v. Dealer's
Transport Co.,4 3 and this case set the precedent for a shift in
emphasis in the interpretation of section 22. In Grasse the
plaintiff was an employee of Swift & Co., and during the course
of his employment, he received personal injuries due to the negligence of an employee of the third-party defendant, Dealer's
Transport Company. Both Mr. Grasse and the employee of the
third-party defendant fell under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, and the sole issue of Grasse, as presented on
appeal, was whether section 29, paragraph 1, of the Act was
constitutional." The constitutional challenge was based, among
other things, upon article IV, section 22. The wording of the
Act in question was as follows:
Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable
by the employer under this Act was not proximately caused by the
negligence of the employer or his employees, and was caused
under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages
in some person other than the employer to pay damages, such other
person having also elected to be bound by this Act, or being
bound thereby under section three (3) of this Act, then the right
of the employee or personal representative to recover against such
other person shall be transferred to his employer and such employer
may bring legal proceedings against such other person to recover
the damages sustained, in an amount not exceeding the aggregate
amount of compensation payable under
this Act, by reason of the
45
injury or death of such employee.
The plaintiff contended that the statute created unreasonable classifications. He alleged that the paragraph in question
divided injured employees into two classes. One class fell under
41

42

Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
See text at note 3 supra.

412 11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
44 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §166 (1947).
" Id.
43
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the Act and could not recover for its injuries by the apparently
mere fortuitous circumstance of whether the wrongdoer also
fell under the Act. Employees who did not fall under the Act
would be allowed recovery. Additionally, the plaintiff argued
that the Act also divided wrongdoers into two classes, those who
were immune from suit and those who could be held liable.
Thirdly, the plaintiff contended that employers were also divided
into two classes, those who might be reimbursed for the losses
sustained in the payment of compensation and those who would
not be reimbursed.46
The question of whether the Act divided either wrongdoers
or employers into two classes, although answered by the court,
was not necessary to its decision. The decisive utterance applied
only to the arbitrary classification that operated upon employees.
A classification which by fortuitous circumstance works to deprive one party of his common law tort action while allowing
another party to maintain such an action cannot be constitutional unless the classification is:
[B]ased upon some real and substantial difference in kind, situation
or circumstance in the persons or objects on which the classification
rests, and which bears a rational relation to the
evil to be remedied
4
and the purpose to be attained by the statute. 1
The defendant contended that there was no constitutional
question concerning classification insofar as the only classification was the single one of persons who fell under the Act and
those who did not. Consequently, since all of the employees that
fell under the Act were to be treated similarly under similar circumstances, the classification was logical and a proper exercise
of the state's police power. The court rejected the argument
that similar treatment satisfies both the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution and article IV, section 22 of
the Illinois constitution. Moreover, the court specifically stated
that section 22 of article IV of the Illinois constitution shall be
considered as supplemental to the equal protection provision of
48
the United States Constitution.
However, the defendant's argument concerning the equal
protection clause certainly seems to have merit. The legislature
has the power to bring some persons within the Workmen's Compensation Act and to exclude others. The question is whether
or not a classification maintaining distinctions among employees
is unreasonable. The classification here was not illogical; nor
46

Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952),

cert. denied,
344 U.S. 837 (1952).
7
4 1d. at 194, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
48 Id. at 194, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
The defendant later argued the question of whether any classes (except the one mentioned above) were created
at all. See Motion of Appellee for Leave to file a Petition for Re-Hearing

of the Court's Amended Decision of May 20, 1952.
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was it patently arbitrary. The intention of the legislature is
argued in Grasse. Nowhere does the court intimate that the

legislature created a patently unreasonable or arbitrary classification among the groups it intended to classify. The opinion
implies that it is the class affected by the legislation, not the one
intentionally created by it, that is the source of the statute's
unconstitutionality.
The classification is the classification of
those who were affected by the Act rather than those who the Act
4 9
literally intended to classify.
This interpretation of the significance of the Grasse case

is supported by the court's later references to the reasoning of
°
that opinion. In Harvey v. Clyde Park District5
the court was
presented with the question of whether the 1959 statute exempting park districts from tort liability was unconstitutional. 51 In
its examination of the statute the court first turned to the standard test: "The determinative question under section 22 of ar52ticle IV is whether the statutory classification is rational.

The court then went on to say that the fact that a statutory

pattern is involved, rather than a single statute, will not bar a
claim brought under the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution. 53 It is the next statement of the court, how-

ever, that both explains some of the reasoning implicit in Grasse
and foreshadows the reasoning of several subsequent decisions:
Nor is it significant that the quoted provision of section 22 of
article IV has been held inapplicable to municipal corporations generally, and park districts in particular. For more is involved here
than just the classification of governmental units. Those persons
who are injured by the negligence of particulargovernmental units
are also classified, and section 22 of article IV prohibits the granting of 'special or exclusive' privileges to individuals. 54
The court then turns directly to Grasse for both its reasoning
and precedent:
The situation in this case is not unlike that which was before
this court in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. Section 29 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act allowed a common law action by an
employee who was injured by the negligence of a third party who
was not bound by the act, but prohibitedsuch an action by an employee who was injured by the negligence of a third party who was
bound by the act. The distinction between the two types of defendants was held insufficient to afford a rational basis of classification from the point of view of the injured person. The court
said: "All employees entitled to compensation for injuries sustained
49 Gas

.Dae'

rnp

o

Grasse v. Dealers Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). As authority the court cites Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
50 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §12.1-1 (1963).

52 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 64, 203 N.E.2d 573, 575
(1964).
53 Id. at 64-65, 203 N.E.2d at 575.
54 Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 576 (emphasis added).
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in the course of their employment and caused by third persons are
not treated alike. Those injured by third party tortfeasors bound
by the act are not entitled to common-law damages from such persons, whereas those injured by third party tortfeasors not bound
by the act are allowed to institute actions for damages. Both
classes of injured employees may be entitled to compensation from
their own employers, so that the amount of compensation, if any,
received by the injured employee is not the basis for differentiation
between the classes. Nor is there any basis for differentiation
from the nature of the injuries sustained, or from the activity
of the employee at the time of the injury, or from any other factor
ordinarily related to an injured party's right to recover damages.
The sole basis for differentiation, as far as the injured employee
is concerned, is a fortuitous circumstance - whether the third
party tort-feasor [sic] happens to be under the act."--,
So far as the court in Harvey is concerned, the reasoning
implicit in Grasse is fully applicable. The Harvey court fully
explains itself. The court hypothesizes the following situation.
If a child were to be injured on a slide negligently maintained by
a school district, or by the state, some limited recovery might be
had against the defendant. On the other hand, if a child, even
the same child, had been injured on a slide negligently maintained
by a forest preserve district, or, as was the case in Harvey, a park
district, no recovery might be had from the defendant. The classification of the governmental units by the legislature is not on
its face unreasonable. But the potential operation of that classification may lead to an unreasonable result. The court states that
a classification which allows the same child injured in the same
way through the same negligence to recover in some situations
but not in others bears "no discernible relationship to the realities
of life." 6, Therefore, the statute relied upon by the defendant
"is arbitrary, and unconstitutionally discriminates against the
plaintiff. ' 57 The language of the court may be the same as that
of the early constitutional decisions, but arbitrary is being applied here not to the classifications intentionally created by the
statute, but to the unintended classifications that came into being
as a result of the operation of the statute.
Just what the court meant when it spoke of a "discernible
relationship to the realities of life" is not clear. It might appear
at first that the court was setting up a vague test that could only
be used on an ad hoc basis. However, the final paragraph of the
opinion refers directly and clearly to the test that the court has
adopted. The court denies that it is undermining all and every
type of class legislation upon municipal tort liability; and it suggests a way in which valid classification might be made:
55 Id. at 65-66, 203 N.E.2d at 576.
56 Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
57 Id.
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From this deeision it does not follow that no valid classifications for purposes of municipal tort liability are possible. On the
contrary it is feasible, and it may be thought desirable, to classify
in terms of types of municipal fuhction, instead of classifying
among different governmental agencies that perform the same
function.50
A valid classification (at least as regards the immunity of governmental units from tort liability) is one that classifies by function. Function, consequently, becomes the outer boundary of
class. There can be no reasonable classification where the function of that which is classified differs from the purpose for which
it was classified. Thus while the classification of governmental
units that perform a certain function is on its face reasonable,

the classification of governmental units as such (i.e., without
regard to their function, but only with regard to the fact that
they are governmental units) is not reasonable. The ruling of
the court in Harvey becomes clearer in the light of more recent
decisions.
In Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dis-

trict59 the plaintiff offered an argument similar to that of the
plaintiff in Harvey. Emma Lorton, a private kindergarten
teacher, received personal injuries due to the alleged negligence
of the defendants in maintaining the school premises. The plaintiff, however, had not filed her notice of injury within the six
months required under the pertinent Illinois statute.6 0 Failure to
file such notice operated as a bar under the statute. Plaintiff
The
argued that the statute violated section 22 of article IV.
court adopted Harvey:
We believe the rationale of Harvey is controlling here, for if
plaintiff's injury had occurred upon the property of a county,
township, or drainage district, her cause of action would not have
been barred by failure to file written notice within six months of
the injury. If, however, the injury had occurred upon the property
of a city or village, public or private school, as was actually the
case, or the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the failure to file written notice within 6 months from the date of injury would wholly
bar her from recovery. As in Harvey, there is in this pattern "no
discernible relationship to the realities of life." 6

If the court here is actually accepting the reasoning of Harvey,
analysis of the case might be made as follows. The legislature
created a classification of school districts and nonprofit private
schools. The classification may have been based on reasonable
differences between such groups and other groups of like kind.

There is nothing patently arbitrary in legislation which distin58Id.

59 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).
60 ILL. Rgv. STAT. ch. 122, §§823-24 (1963).
62 Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dist., 35 111. 2d 362,
365-66, 220 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1966).
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guishes these groups from others for various purposes. But the
question here was whether the classification for the purpose of
providing certain procedural steps that must be taken in originating law suits against the schools was reasonable. One test of
reasonableness is whether the classification operates in different
ways upon persons similarly situated. The court looks to see if
the setting up of one class produces, in effect, other classes among
persons similarly situated. Insofar as this latter classification
differentiates among persons who are similarly situated (and in
no way rationally distinguishable), it is both arbitrary and unreasonable.
"The courts of this State must be open to all those similarly situated
upon the same conditions, and where procedures are provided which
are applicable to some and not applicable to others under substantially like circumstances and there are no discernible logical reasons apparent for the variations, they must fall as violative of
section 22 of article IV of the Illinois constitution. '"
The court is holding that where the function of that which is
classified (in this case education is the function of that which
is classified) differs from the purpose for which it was classified
(here to set procedural limitations in legal actions), the classification cannot be valid under section 22. The test to find if
there is an inconsistency between the purpose of the classification
and that which is actually classified is whether the original legislative classification (public and non-profit schools) creates,
through its operation on persons similarly situated, a second
classification that on its face would be unreasonable. In Lorton
the court could find no rational distinction between those who
were injured on the property of a governmental unit devoted to
educational purposes and those who were injured in an identical
manner on the property of a governmental unit devoted to sanitation.68
Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School District4 exemplifies two contrasting ways that the Illinois Supreme Court has
treated the application of section 22. In an action arising from a
fatal accident in a physical education class, the defendant school
district asked leave to file a third party counterclaim against the
physical education teacher. The trial court refused the motion,
citing section 10-21.6 of the School Code.6 5 The trial court
concluded that since the teacher would be entitled to indemnification by the school district for any loss resulting from the plaintiff's suit, no action by the district for damages against the
teacher could be sustained. The defendant school district ap62

Id. at 366, 220 N.E.2d at 163.
6 Id. at 365-66, 220 N.E.2d at 163.
6439 IM. 2d 136, 233 N.E.2d 549 (1968).
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §10-21.6 (1965).
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pealed alleging that section 10-21.6 of the School Code was in
violation of section 22 insofar as it may grant "a special or exclusive privilege" to employees of. a school district having a
population of less than 500,000.0 The court ruled that although

different sized school districts may carry the burdens of different duties (i.e., to indemnify employees of the district when the
population is less than 500,000 and to insure them when the population exceeds 500,000), the general intent and effect of section
10-21.6 was within constitutional bounds.
We reject the argument that this difference between the
duties imposed on school boards, i.e., to indemnify in one case
and to insure in the other, based on population, violates section 22
of article IV of the constitution. In Latham v. Board of Education we said at page 182 that: "The controlling rule is well established that: 'Classification on the basis of population is not objectionable where there is reasonable basis therefore in view of
the object and purpose to be accomplished by the legislation and
such an act is not local or special merely because it operates in
only one place, if that is where the conditions necessary to its operation exist.

' "67

The defendant school district based its argument on Harvey,
quoting the court's statement that "there is no discernible relationship to the realities of life" in legislation that allowed different recoveries to similarly situated plaintiffs. The Treece court,
in considering the school district's argument, said that in Harvey
the court was striking down legislation that created a contradicting pattern of immunity and liability among similar governmen66Under section 10-21.6 a school board has the duty:
To indemnify and protect school districts, members of boards of educa-

tion, employees, and student teachers against death and bodily injury
and property damage claims and suits, including defense thereof, when
damages are sought for negligent or wrongful acts alleged to have
been committed in the scope of employment or under the direction of the
board of education. No agent may be afforded indemnification or protection unless he is a member of a board of education, an employee of a
board of education or a student teacher.
Prior to amendment in 1965, section 10-21.6 was worked exactly as section
34-18.1 of the School Code, which applies to school districts with a population of over 500,000. Section 34-18.1 reads:
The board of education shall insure any member of the board or
any agent, employee, teacher, officer or member of the supervisory staff
of the school district against financial loss and expense including reasonable legal fees and costs arising out of any claim, demand, suit, or
judgment by reason of alleged negligence or alleged wrongful act resulting in death or bodily injury to any person or accidental damage to
or destruction of property, within or without the school premises, provided such board member, agent, employee, teacher, officer or member
of the supervisory staff, at the time of the occurrence resulting in such
death, bodily injury, or damage to or destruction of property was acting
under the direction of the board within the course or scope of his duties.
In 1965 section 10-21.6 was revised so that it no longer imposed a duty on a
board to insure school officers, agents, and employees against financial loss
but does impose a duty to indemnify them. Section 34-18.1 retained the
duty to insure in a school district with a population of over 500,000.
67 Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d 136, 141,
233 N.E.2d 549, 552 (1968).
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tal entities, whereas in the case at hand a legislative requirement
that school districts with a population of over 500,000 cover
employees through insurance cannot be said to be arbitrary and
unreasonable. The court referred to its opinion in Gaca v. City
of Chicago:88
The question of classification ... is dictinctly within the province
of the legislature, and this has never been a judicial question except
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the legislative action is
clearly unreasonable.6 9
In further support it turned to Du Bois v. Gibbons,7 0 in which the
court had declared that:
[A] legislative classification based upon population will be sustained
where founded on a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the persons or objects upon which it rests and there is a
reasonable basis for the classification
in view of the objects and
71
purposes to be accomplished.
On the face of the argument, Treece seems to have reverted to
earlier interpretations of article IV, section 22. But the court
was merely distinguishing cases of classification by governmental
unit from those of classification by population. Both apparent
reasons for the court's action are inadequate, however, to explain
the court's assertion at the end of the opinion that the recovery
limitation of the current school code would be stricken as unconstitutional if that question were to be presented:
We deem that the challenge by the defendant Bridewell to the
constitutionality of section 825A of the School Code which limits
the recovery in each separate cause of action against a public school
district to $10,000 is well founded. While this court has not specifically ruled on the validity of the restricting statute in question,
our attitude toward arbitrarily formulated and restricting statutes
of this type has been made clear by our expressions in Lorton v.
Brown County Community
Unit School District and Harvey v.
7
Clyde Park District. 2
Implicit in the court's reasoning is the concept that classifications of governmental units by population are generally constitutional because the classification only affects the groups
themselves. And all members of the groups are similarly situated. No secondary classification of persons occurs as the
proximate result of the first classification. Additionally, there is
no problem as to the function of that which is classified since
there can be no conflict between the purpose of the classification
and the function of the groups classified. Consequently, the tests
of the earliest cases under section 22 are applicable. On the
other hand, to the extent that section 825A of the School Code
68 411 Ill. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617 (1952).
89Id. at 154, 103 N.E.2d at 622.
70 2

Ill. 2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954).

Id. at 399, 118 N.E.2d at 300 (1954).

72 Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d 136, 14546, 233 N.E.2d 549, 554 (1968).
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created a classification that in turn would operate to effect another classification among individuals similarly situated, the
court found a violation of section 22.73
It was only a matter of months after Treece that the court
declared unconstitutional another section of the School Code. In
Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago74 the plaintiff was injured due to the negligence of a nonprofit private school. After
receiving $10,000 damages (the maximum then allowable under
the code) in a jury trial, the plaintiff appealed, asserting the
unconstitutionality of the damage limitation. The court decided
in his favor. The court gave a summary of recent applications
of section 22. Speaking of the challenged section 825B the court
said:
That provision is part of the comprehensive School Tort Liability Act designed, as set forth in section 821, to protect public and
nonprofit private schools conducted by bona fide eleemosynary and
religious institutions from excessive diversion of their funds from
their educational functions. The School Tort Liability Act of
1959 was one of numerous statutes enacted within two months after
the decision of this court in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist., was announced on May 21, 1959, and before the rehearing
and final decision in that case on December 16, 1959. In Molitor
the court abolished prospectively the tort immunity of school districts, and rejected as "unjust and unsupported by reason" the vestigial concept of government tort immunity. The legislature
modified the Molitor decision by enacting that series of laws granting absolute immunity to some units of government and limited
the liability of others. Some of those statutes have been held unconstitutional in violation of section 22 of article IV of the Illinois
constitution insofar as they created an arbitrary and irrational
pattern for imposing tort liability on governmental units. Harvey
v. Clyde Park Dist., Hutchings v. Kraject, Lorton v. Brown County
Community Unit School Dist.
The constitutionality of the School Tort Liability Act itself
was first considered in Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit
School Dist., where the notice requirements (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959,
chap. 122, par. 823) were deemed to violate section 22 of article

IV of the Illinois constitution. The court enunciated the guidelines for resolving the constitutional question at p. 366: "The
courts of this State must be open to all those similarly situated
upon the same conditions, and where procedures are provided
which are applicable to some and not applicable to others under
substantially like circumstances and there are no discernible logi-

cal reasons apparent for the variations, they must fall
as violative
76
of section 22 of article IV of the Illinois constitution."
A more recent case, Begich v. Industrial Commission,"7
Id. at 145-46, 233 N.E.2d at 554.
41 Ill. 2d 336, 243 N.E.2d 203 (1968).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §825B (1959).
76 41 Ill. 2d 336, 342-44 243 N.E 2d 203, 206-07 (1968).
77 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.EZ.2d 457 (969).
73

74
75
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adopts the reasoning of Grasse, Harvey, and Treece. The question presented to the court was whether the provision in section
8 (e) 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act-s that limits recovery
to compensation for the loss of a hand, though part of the
forearm has been removed for the purpose of permitting the use
of an artificial member, is constitutional. The court accepted
the plaintiff's argument that the legislature cannot constitutionally provide that an injured employee's measure of recovery
should be determined by the point of injurious impact rather
than the actual extent of injury. The plaintiff had argued that
employees were receiving different recoveries for essentially
similar injuries. 9 The legislature had created a classification
of recovery based on impact of injury, but that classification had
operated to create other classes among persons similarly situated:
Here, the classification of employees such as the appellant is based
on the situs of the trauma without regard to the final disability or
loss incurred as a result of the employment injury. We cannot
find a reasonable basis for differentiating between the appellant's
class and those who lost the use of an arm solely through trauma.
The attempted classification is unrealistic or, as we put it in
Harvey, does not bear any "discernible relationship to the realities
of life."80
In Begich the legislative classification was not of persons but of
the loss which persons suffer. The legislature had classified recovery and the impact of injury. But the court said that such
classification affected "the final disability or loss" of individuals
who had been similarly injured. Begich is a logical extension
of Grasse, Harvey, Lorton, and Treece.
Another recent case, Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo,
Peoria& Western RailroadCo. 81 indicates the extent to which the
court has utilized this type of reasoning. The plaintiff oil company had leased property from the defendant railroad adjacent
to the railroad tracks. A train operated by the defendant derailed, and property of the plaintiff was damaged. The lease between the parties contained an exculpatory clause providing that
the lessee should hold the railroad harmless for losses arising
through the negligence of the railroad. The trial court held that
the exculpatory clause barred the plaintiff from recovering. It
looked to a 1959 statute which voided certain exculpatory clauses
in leases, but which excepted, inter alia, corporations regulated
by a state or federal commission or agency. 2 The plaintiff urged
that the statute be held unconstitutional insofar as it made a
78 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §138.8(e)9 (1967).
79 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).

Id. at 37, 245 N.E.2d at 459.
81 42 Ill.
2d 265, 247 N.E.2d 603 (1969).
8
2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, §15(a) (1967).
80
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discriminatory classification without reasonable basis. The court,
without even entertaining in its opinion the arguments of the defendant on this point, held that the .statute violated section 22.
We see no reasonable basis for exempting municipal corporations,
governmental units or corporations regulated by a state or federal
commission from the provisions of this statute. The statute in
effect grants immunity to these governmental units and regulated
83
corporations in an unconstitutional manner and is therefore void.
But why should it be void under section 22? Certainly, on its
face the distinction drawn by the legislature is not unreasonable.
Nor is it patently arbitrary. It is not a necessary deduction that
the distinction between corporations regulated by a state or federal commission or agency and corporations not so regulated is
irrational. But the court was not interested in whether the distinction was rational. It demanded that the statute affirmatively
state a reasonable basis for the immunity,8 4 thereby asserting by
implication that the rationale of the distinction was not embodied
in the act's description of the objects to which the act applied. 8 5
If, as it appears, the distinction is not irrational on its face, the
court must be requiring that the legislature do precisely that
which Justice House (dissenting in Begich) argued the legislature has no constitutional need to do.8 Additionally, if the basis
that the legislature had written into the statute did not classify
by function, the basis might not be reasonable under Harvey.87
CONCLUSION

There are two closely related tests that can be used in evaluating a statute under article IV, section 22. The court will ask
if the classification created by the legislature, even though not
arbitrary or irrational on its face, operates to effect a secondary
classification among persons who are similarly situated. If it
does, the classification will be said to have created a privilege
or immunity that is constitutionally forbidden. In addition, the
court will look to the statute to see if the class legislated for is
one that is defined functionally. If it is, then the statute may be
valid; but if it is not, and if the court finds none of the other
permissible ways of defining the class for the purposes of classification, then the classification will be said to have created a
privilege or immunity that is constitutionally forbidden. At least
these rules hold true for the purposes of statutes that limit plaintiffs in respect to (1) access to courts, (2) remedies available,
and (3) monetary damages. Apparently, classifications by popu8342 Ill. 2d 265, 267, 247 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1969).
84 Id. at 266-67, 247 N.E.2d at 604-05.
85 This is precisely the demand outlined in Kales' first rule; see note 30
supra.
86 Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
87 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
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lation are subject to these rules; although it is not clear what
effect the Treece ruling against the defendant school board has on
the argument that a statute that classifies by population has a
discernible enough relationship to the realities of life that it
may not be challenged as essentially irrational and patently arbitrary on that ground alone.
It is not difficult to predict the types of statutes that will
be attacked under the case law that has developed in tort cases
from Grasse through Treece. Notice provisions in general may
be subject to attack. The provision, for example,. that the Chicago Transit Authority be exempt from actions for personal injuries where there has been no notice is typical of the type of
statute that may be attacked. It can be expected that the plaintiff would argue that there is no essential difference in situation
between a class of persons injured in an accident with a vehicle
of the Chicago Transit Authority and a vehicle of any other
owner. The argument would follow Harvey and assert, for example, that a pedestrian injured, by a bus of the ABC Transit
Corporation who gives no notice of an accident within a six
month period to that corporation is treated differently from a
pedestrian injured in precisely the same manner by a bus of
the Chicago Transit Authority. If he gave no notice within the
statutory period, he is barred. The only difference, as far as the
plaintiff is concerned, is that in the second instance he was unlucky enough to have been injured by the wrong legal entity.
Similarly, statutes such as the guest act may be vulnerable
to attack under Harvey. It is generally conceded that an auto
guest could recover at common law where the action was based
on the ordinary negligence of the driver. 8 The statute precludes
recovery for such ordinary negligence.89 The argument for allowing recovery for ordinary negligence under section 22 would
certainly speak in terms of a comparison between a person injured in an auto and one injured in a boat. Under the statute,
the auto guest must prove more than ordinary negligence. The
guest in a boat, other elements being assumed equal, must prove
only ordinary negligence. The question arising under Harvey
and the subsequent cases would be whether there exists a rational
difference of condition or situation in the persons or objects upon
which the classification rests. 90 If the legislative classification
is based on function, there will probably be no problem in upholding it, especially in the light of the strong public policy in
favor of the statute. But if the original legislative classification
88 Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 239 N.E.2d 795 (1968); Reed v.
Zellers, 273 Il. App. 18 (1933).
89 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95'/, §9-201 (1967).
90 Begich v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Ill. 2d 32, 245 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
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operates in such a way as to create a secondary classification upon
persons or objects similarly situated, the court may find it unconstitutional. 9'1
Another area of possible attack upon a classification arises
in connection with the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. The Act
does not provide for punitive damages. Early case law provided the rule that where the statute was the creature of the
legislature, and the legislature saw fit to provide only for certain
types of compensation to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's remedy had
to be confined to those remedies. 9'2 As a consequence of the conjunction of the Act and the case law, the anomalous situation
exists that where a party is injured through the willful, wanton,
and reckless conduct of a defendant and manages to survive
his injuries, he may collect punitive damages; but where the defendant manages to kill by way of his recklessness, the defendant need not worry about paying punitive damages to, for example, a surviving spouse or children of the deceased. It is
anticipated that an action will eventually reach the supreme court
on this question; and the plaintiff will probably argue that the
rule creates arbitrary classifications of both the defendant and
the plaintiffs in violation of section 22, and the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. 3
Another interesting possibility of the application of section
22 has recently been raised.9 4 The decisions of the Illinois Su5
preme Court in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District,9
Harvey, Hutchings, Lort on, and Treece have effectively abolished
the immunity from tort liability of all of Illinois' governmental
units except the state itself. The State of Illinois cannot be sued
under its constitution. 6 In none of the cases in which the Illinois
Supreme Court decided that the governmental unit under attack
could be sued did that court have to discuss the immunity of
91 This is the form of the argument taken in at least one case: see Brief
for Appellant at 11-20, Delany v. Bedame, No. 41616 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed
May 1, 1969).
92 Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410 (1868).
93 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant Sky Climber Division, Western Gear Corporation's Motion to

Strike that dount of Plaintiff's Complaint Seeking Recovery of Punitive
Damages in Addition to Recovery under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act,
Jackson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., No. 67 L 18281 (Cir. Ct., Cook
County, 1969).
94See, Brief for Appellant, Edelen v. State of Illinois, No. 41457 (Ill.
Sup. Ct., filed November, 1968), and the answering Brief for Appellee. The
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the Illinois constitution and the case law from Grasse through Treece effectively destroys the sovereign immunity of the state despite the Illinois
constitutional prohibition of suits or actions in equity or law against the

state.
95 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
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the state itself. But the discussions of the court in those cases,
and especially in Molitor, of the whole question of sovereign immunity indicates that the concept is repugnant to the court.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Molitor adopted the language of
Barker v. City of Santa Fe.97 The court said:
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for
tort rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that
in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and
in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in
the maxim, 'the King can do no wrong,' should exempt the various
branches of government from liability for their torts, and that the
entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the
government should be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly belongs." s
The plaintiff would argue that the constitutional prohibition
against suits against the state is a form of classification similar
to those struck down under Harvey. The plaintiff's argument
would rest partly on the two tests for whether a classification
is valid: (1) does the classification operate to effect a secondary
classification of persons that in itself would be unreasonable, or
(2) does the classification classify by function. The contention
would be that the distinction between the state as a class and all
other entities could lead to situations outlined in Harvey wherein
persons similarly situated would be granted or denied relief
on the sole basis of the class of the defendant.9 9 Additionally,
they would argue that the classification of the state as immune
while other entities have no such immunity has no relationship
to the function of that which is classified. Were there no constitutional prohibition in Illinois against a suit against the state,
the result of such a case might be in keeping with the decisions
of Molitor through Treece. The problems inherent in the constitutional prohibition, however, cannot be overcome without
resort to the United States Constitution. Such questions as arise
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution are outside of the scope of this paper. It
should be recognized, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court
has by way of dictum said that the classifications that it struck
down were repugnant to both the Illinois and United States
Constitutions.- °°
Michael Morrisroe, Jr.
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99 Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 6.0, 65-66, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576
(1964).
100 Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 I1. 179, 200, 106 N.E.2d 124, 135
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